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This report presents the results of an analysis of the impact that international freight traffic barriers have on logistics, transit potential, and 
development of transport corridors traversing EAEU member states. The authors of EDB Centre for Integration Studies Report No. 49 
maintain that, if current railway freight rates and Chinese railway subsidies remain in place, by 2020 container traffic along the China-EAEU-EU 
axis may reach 250,000 FEU. At the same time, long-term freight traffic growth is restricted by a number of internal and external factors. 
The question is: What can be done to fully realise the existing trans-Eurasian transit potential? Removal of non-tariff and technical barriers is 
one of the key target  areas. Restrictions  discussed  in  this  report include infrastructural (transport and logistical infrastructure),  
border/customs-related,  and  administrative/legal  restrictions. The findings of a survey conducted among European consignors is a valuable 
source of information on these subjects. The authors present their recommendations regarding what can be done to remove the barriers that 
hamper international freight traffic along the China-EAEU-EU axis. 
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Major Trans-
Eurasian Corridors
Source: EDB
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Summary  
• In our previous report, we came to the conclusion that rapid growth of 
EU-China container traffic using EAEU railways will continue in the short 
term. The current through-freight rate (including Chinese subsidies) of $5,500 
per FEU may encourage further growth of container traffic to 500,000 FEU in 2020 
(a three-fold increase over three years). However, to attract additional freight traf-
fic, it is necessary to further expand transport infrastructure and remove a number 
of barriers. The EAEU and China’s domestic railway networks and their transport 
capacities are quite sufficient to meet the existing transport needs along the Chi-
na-EAEU-EU axis. Container trains currently boast schedule compliance rates of 
up to 99%, with routes and schedules having been negotiated and approved by all 
transcontinental freight traffic stakeholders.
• That said, long-term growth of container traffic is inhibited by certain ex-
ternal and internal factors, and by the risk that Chinese provinces will dis-
continue export container traffic subsidies. Further growth will be contingent 
upon investments to remove physical bottlenecks in the EAEU railway infrastruc-
ture, lower freight rates, and guarantee the preservation of PRC transport subsi-
dies.
• A critical infrastructural restriction is imposed on the future growth of 
trans-Eurasian transit by the inferior transport and processing capacity 
of Polish railways, including crossing points at the Belarus-Poland border. 
The most intensive container train traffic is at the crossing point Brest (Belarus) 
— Małaszewicze (Poland). It is included in almost all routes linking China and 
the EU. Given the current state of Poland’s railway infrastructure, locomotive 
fleet, and rolling stock, any significant increase of container traffic through the 
Brest-Małaszewicze crossing point is bound to be extremely problematic. Even 
today, the Polish side processes only 9–10 trains per day instead of the negotiated 
14 trains.
The aggregate capacity of existing and prospective Polish processing infra-
structure is considerably lower than the volume of container traffic planned 
by many trans-Eurasian transit participants. The PRC seeks to have 5,000 
Europe-bound trains by 2020, with Kazakhstan projecting a container transit in-
crease to two million TEU. According to our estimates, the anticipated expansion 
of the Belarusian Railway container train processing infrastructure at the Bru-
zgi-Kuźnica Białostocka and Swislocz-Siemianówka crossing points will not re-
solve the problems related to the exhaustion of technical capabilities required to 
boost the Brest Hub’s processing capacity. This calls for additional investments 
and a substantial effort to upgrade Polish border crossing points, as well as 
an overall improvement of Polish railway infrastructure in the East-West direc-
tion. However, Poland is refraining, at least for the time being, from investing in 
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China-EU routes, and is instead channelling all available resources into railway 
routes linking Baltic ports to South Europe (North-South). This is contrary to the 
interests of trans-Eurasian transit.
Differences in container train lengths impose another restriction on the de-
velopment of transcontinental transit along the PRC-EAEU-EU axis. While in 
Russia an average train has 71 conventional railway cars (994 m), and in Belarus 
57–65 conventional railway cars (up to 910 m), in Poland the technical regulations 
limit train length to 600 m. Accordingly, trains leaving Małaszewicze can have a 
maximum of 43 cars carrying 86 TEU. As a result, if a 65-car container train arrives 
at the border with Poland, the cars have to split up: a 43-car train is composed as 
the containers are transhipped in Brest, while the remaining 22 cars have to wait 
at the marshalling station for the next train to be made up. This results in loss of 
time, accumulation of containers at crossing points, and higher costs.
The low speed of freight trains in EU countries has a negative impact on de-
livery time, which should be the key competitive advantage of land contain-
er transport. Container trains hurtling through the EAEU at an average section 
speed of 41 km/h slow down dramatically as they enter the EU. Cargo trains trav-
el through international segments of European railways at an average speed of 
18.2 km/h, with Poland posting the lowest cargo train speeds in Europe. However, 
European countries still charge much higher railway freight rates than countries 
such as Russia. Over the last several years, freight train traffic in many EU coun-
tries has been neglected, with shortage of investment capital and lack of mod-
ernisation efforts giving rise to a noticeable delay in the development of railway 
infrastructure.
• Insufficient standardisation of shipping documents and technical regula-
tions is the main administrative and legal obstacle to the increase of freight 
traffic among the PRC, EAEU member states, and the EU. In most European 
countries, railway freight traffic is regulated by the Convention concerning Inter-
national Carriage by Rail (COTIF). CIS countries, the Baltic states, Albania, Iran, 
the PRC, the DPRK, Vietnam, Mongolia, Hungary, and Slovakia use the Agree-
ment on International Goods Transport by Rail (SMGS). The use of the CIM/SMGS 
common consignment note gives a strong competitive edge to railway shipments 
through Eurasian space. However, more work needs to be done to standardise nor-
mative documents and technical regulations used in Eurasian countries (rules for 
shipping various types of cargoes, rolling stock operating parameters, environ-
mental standards, etc.).
• It is often claimed that differences in track gauge and border/customs in-
spections act as major barriers to increasing freight traffic along the PRC-
EAEU-EU axis. We, however, believe that these two barriers are not critical 
in their impact on the cost and speed of delivery. Differences in track gauge 
necessitate container transhipment or bogie exchange at border crossing sta-
tions. This takes from two to six hours, on average. Completion of border/customs 
formalities in EAEU member states usually requires a maximum of four hours. 
10
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EAEU member states pursue a coherent policy designed to standardise  border/
customs rules and documents, and to streamline related regulations to minimise 
the time required to complete border/customs formalities.
• Long-range investment activities in EAEU member states:
— No mega-projects are required to expand the transport capacity of land cor-
ridors along the PRC-EAEU-EU axis and boost their competitiveness vis-à-vis 
sea routes. What we need is not a “second Trans-Siberian Railway” but selective 
elimination of transport infrastructure bottlenecks, which can be managed 
with limited financial outlay: construction of additional railways, electrification 
of new railway sections, upgrade and modernation of locomotives, acquisition of 
special rolling stock, improvement of border crossing infrastructure, etc.
— Creation of backbone transport hubs/terminal and logistics centres 
(TLCs) in Russia, Kazakhstan, and Belarus. The lack of backbone TLCs in 
the EAEU pushes up mileage and, accordingly, shipping costs incurred by con-
signors, and increases cargo accumulation and distribution times. Objectives 
for the creation of transport hubs/TLCs in the EAEU include the following: 
(1) processing (in border-adjacent areas) of container cargoes entering the 
EAEU (from the PRC and from the EU) and their subsequent distribution by rail-
way/road transport; (2) accumulation of container cargoes in hubs/TLCs and 
their subsequent export to the PRC and EU countries by railway/road transport 
(short-haul operations); (3) possible future accumulation of container cargoes 
in hubs/TLCs for additional loading of transit container trains travelling along 
the PRC-EAEU-EU axis.
— Expansion of international freight traffic by using special containers/cargo box-
es (for chemical and mineral cargoes) and refrigerator containers (for food prod-
ucts).
— Investing in alternative East-West container train routes, as EAEU member 
states cannot speed up construction of railway infrastructure in Poland. Pos-
sible key investment targets include: (1) expanded use of the Saint Petersburg 
transport hub; (2) international transit use of the transport and logistical in-
frastructure of Kaliningrad Region (transhipment stations in Chernyakhovsk 
and Kaliningrad). To assure full-scale use of the route, it may be necessary to 
invest in boosting the processing capacity of transhipment stations and im-
proving the border crossing infrastructure (Poland-Kaliningrad Region, Lithu-
ania-Kaliningrad Region).
• Involvement of Chinese direct investors will make BRI projects more at-
tractive for European investors. In the opinion of potential European inves-
tors, direct investments by companies from the PRC (rather than credits ex-
tended by Chinese banks) may increase the investment appeal of BRI projects, 
signalling the emergence of a favourable and stable investment environment 
in the target area.
• European consignors do not have enough information on the advantag-
es/terms of using trans-Eurasian land transport corridors (delivery times, 
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number of active transport modalities, door-to-door delivery capability, de-
livery costs) or on the development status of transport corridors and available 
routes (primarily railway routes). A survey conducted among European con-
signors has shown that companies that have no trans-Eurasian shipping track 
record estimate the time of delivery of a 40-foot container at 20–30 days and 
the cost of delivery at $10,000–15,000 (see Figure A). In both cases, the actual 
figures are much lower. It is necessary to promote the use of trans-Eura-
sian railway transport along the PRC-EAEU-EU axis. This may generate 
additional freight traffic from the EU to the PRC and, accordingly, reduce 
the share of empty return containers.
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1. Existing Barriers in the PRC, EAEU Member 
States, and the EU,  and Their Impact on 
Freight Traffic along the PRC-EAEU-EU Axis
Non-tariff barriers to international railway freight traffic can be classified as follows:
• infrastructural barriers (transport and logistical infrastructure);
• border/customs-related barriers;
• administrative/legal barriers.
Existing barriers and short-term difficulties related to the provision of international 
railway freight services only have an indirect impact on the transport component of 
foreign trade prices, because container shipping costs are determined in advance by 
the rates charged for specific processing and delivery operations.
At the same time, in the medium and long term, the emergence of barriers associated 
with issues such as transport infrastructure bottlenecks or administrative/legal proce-
dures may significantly influence the ultimate cost of a foreign trade operation by in-
creasing expenses, partially reducing the profit received by the consignor, or even ren-
dering the use of a specific delivery route completely unviable in economic terms. If a 
container train suffers an excessive delay when crossing the border (due to inadequate 
transport capacity of the crossing point or differences in track gauge), the operator may 
indemnify the consignor at the expense of the railway company that caused the delay. 
However, due to the loss of time and the failure of the consignor to properly discharge its 
contractual obligations before third parties, total containerised cargo shipping costs may 
greatly exceed the through-freight rate, and the share of the transport component in the 
total costs may plunge the profitability of the relevant foreign trade operation below the 
breakeven point.
1.1. Infrastructural Barriers
Transport Capacity of Railway Infrastructure
The volume of Eurasian railway container freight (primarily between China and Eu-
rope1) generally remains quite modest, despite its rapid increase in recent years (see 
EDB Centre for Integration Studies, 2018). Russian, Kazakhstani, and Belarusian rail-
way infrastructure is used primarily to transport massive high-tonnage cargoes (coal, 
iron ore, metals, mineral construction materials, timber, etc.) and passengers.
Considering that container trains travel on agreed schedules, the transport capacity 
of railway infrastructure in EAEU member states, China, and EU countries has had 
little, if any, restraining effect on the volume and intensity of railway container traffic 
1 In this report, the terms “European countries” and “Europe” refer to European Union member states.
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along the China-EAEU-EU axis. Container trains currently boast schedule compliance 
rates of up to 99%, with routes and schedules having been negotiated and approved 
by all stakeholders, including railway companies from China, Russia, Kazakhstan, 
Belarus, and EU countries (see Attachment).
The situation with the transport capacity of domestic railway networks along the 
PRC-EAEU-EU axis is currently as follows:
• China. The infrastructure of the rapidly growing Chinese railways is more than 
sufficient to support future container traffic along the PRC-EAEU-EU axis. The 
westbound high-speed train service ends at Urumqi. In addition, there is a plan to 
launch a high-speed freight transit service at the Urumqi-Dostyk section by 2026, 
within the framework of the Central Eurasian Corridor development project.
• Russia. The main East-West transport corridor railway lines crossing Russia2 are 
fully electrified, double-track lines, equipped with automatic block systems3. Work 
continues to modernise turnouts from the Trans-Siberian Railway going down 
to the border with China (Karymskaya-Zabaykalsk) and Mongolia (Zaudinsky- 
Naushki). The Zabaykalsk-Borzya and Borzya-Olovyannaya sections are the most 
heavily loaded in terms of transport capacity utilisation. Russian Railways is cur-
rently completing electrification of those sections, and concurrently implement-
ing a comprehensive reconstruction project at Zabaykalsk Station.
• Kazakhstan. Kazakhstani railway infrastructure along international transit routes 
is characterised by lack of sufficient transport capacity reserves. To adequately 
support future transit container traffic, it will be necessary to:
— enforce common network standards, including those governing cargo train lengths;
— build second main tracks at sections with limited transport capacity;
— modernise SCB (signalling, centralisation, and blocking) and communication 
devices, among other things, by replacing semi-automatic blocking systems with 
fully automatic blocking systems or centralised traffic control systems;
— build bypass routes around major transport hubs (e.g., Almaty Railway Hub);
— electrify sections leading to crossing points at the border with the PRC.
• Belarus. Transit container traffic traverses Belarus primarily through Osinovka- 
Orsha-Brest, an electrified double-track section. A fibre-optic cable is laid 
throughout the length of the transport corridor across the Republic of Belarus. 
There is a plan to modernise SCB and communication devices by 2020 to en-
able a high-speed train service. About $2.5 billion was invested in 2011–2017 
in projects designed to enhance the Belarusian Railway’s capacity, including a 
$700 million investment in the development of Belt and Road routes. Specifi-
cally, the country purchased 30 modern electric locomotives, and paid consid-
erable attention to the electrification of sections making up the key transport 
corridors (Ananyev, 2017).
2 (1) Krasnoe–Moscow–Nizhny Novgorod–Kotelnich–Perm–Yekaterinburg–Omsk–Novosibirsk–Krasnoyarsk–Irkutsk–Petrovsky 
Zavod–Karymskaya–Volochaevka–Nakhodka/Vanino/Khasan; (2) Krasnoe–Moscow–Yekaterinburg–Kartaly.
3 Automatic block system (in railway transport): a system enabling automatic regulation of train traffic within a railway 
section using intermediate light signals.
14
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• EU Countries. The transport capacity of EU railway infrastructure is limited, and in the 
medium term may prove incapable of supporting the growing transit container traffic. 
This is largely attributable to the technological and regulatory differences between rail-
way transport operations in the PRC, the EAEU, and the EU (see following sections).
Processing Capacity of Railway Infrastructure at International Crossing Points
Until 2017, the intensity of freight traffic through international crossing points remained 
relatively low. In 2016, the number of container trains reached 1,700 (1,130 from China to 
Europe, and 572 from Europe to China), but the average number of trains crossing the bor-
ders between China and Russia/Kazakhstan/Mongolia in the east and the Poland-Belarus 
border in the west was fewer than five per day. In 2017, the total number of trains went up 
to 3,700 (2,400 from China to Europe, and 1,300 from Europe to China), and the number of 
trains crossing eastern and western EAEU borders exceeded 10 per day (CRCT, 2018).
For example, according to the 2017 train schedule, the crossing point at Dostyk-Alashankou 
was used by no more than five container trains per day, even though the potential process-
ing capacity of Dostyk Station is about nine container trains per day (Bektiyarova, 2016). 
The crossing point at Zabaykalsk-Manchuria is used by a maximum of two container trains 
per day, while its potential processing capacity is about 10 per day (RZD TV, 2014).
Modern processing equipment installed at the new crossing point at the China-Kazakhstan 
border (Altynkol-Khorgos), including a dry port facility, covers all transit by a wide margin, 
and may lure away some of the freight traffic currently going through Dostyk. According to 
PJSC TransContainer, the crossing point at Zabaykalsk-Manchuria will support an almost 
tenfold increase in the volume of processed transit container traffic (up to 470,000 TEU per 
year), and half of that increase could be achieved at relatively short notice (RZD TV, 2014).
Currently, insufficient processing capacity of the crossing points at the Belarus-Po-
land border remains the narrowest bottleneck deterring expansion of China-EU tran-
sit container traffic. The most intensive container train traffic is registered at the Brest 
(Belarus)-Małaszewicze (Poland) crossing point. It is included in almost all routes 
linking China and the EU. Over the first nine months of 2017, the number of transit 
container trains travelling by the Belarusian Railway from China to Europe and from 
Europe to China amounted to 1,109 and 759, respectively. According to the Belarusian 
Railway, an average of eight PRC-Europe-PRC container trains run through Belarus 
every day (BELTA, 2017; The Belarusian Railway, 2017).
Due to the current state of Poland’s railway infrastructure, locomotive fleet, and rolling 
stock, a significant increase of container traffic through the Brest-Małaszewicze crossing 
point appears to be very unlikely. Even today, the Polish side only processes 9–10 trains 
per day instead of the negotiated 14 trains. Poland anticipates that upon completion of the 
modernisation of Polish railway infrastructure to improve freight transit across the Bela-
rus-Poland border, all five railway crossing points4 with a higher aggregate processing ca-
pacity (including transhipment on the Belarusian side of the border) will be up and running, 
alleviating the current situation with respect to processing container trains (Tonin, 2017).
4 Brest–Małaszewicze, Bruzgi–Kuźnica Białostocka, Swislocz–Siemianówka, and Wysokie Litewskie–Czeremcha (which 
currently has no dual gauge), all used for freight traffic and equipped for customs clearance, and Bierestovica–Zubki, 
currently out of service.
1 . EXISTING BARRIERS IN THE PRC, EAEU MEMBER STATES, AND THE EU, 
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It should be noted that the EU Multiannual Financial Framework 2014–2020 envis-
ages allocation of resources from a special-purpose €10.2 billion fund to finance de-
velopment of Polish railway infrastructure (Jesionkiewicz, 2017); however, almost all 
relevant ongoing and scheduled projects focus on the improvement of North-South 
lines. The European Commission has already approved the allocation of €475 million 
to continue the implementation of eight major Polish railway infrastructure develop-
ment projects until 2020. Four projects with a total cost of €319.3 million deal with 
the modernisation of the railway connecting Masovian and Łódź provinces (voivode-
ships) and have been designed to improve railway access to Warsaw. The European 
Commission will also provide €74.6 million to modernise the Czempiń-Poznań rail-
way, part of the Baltic-Adriatic Corridor of the trans-European TEN-T Network. In 
addition, the Polish government has approved €81.5 million to modernise railways in 
the Pomorze region, another part of the Baltic-Adriatic Corridor. Implementation of 
the project will enhance the railway network in the environs of Gdańsk (including the 
Gdańsk Port) and Gdynia (RZD-Partner, 2016). Besides, within the framework of two 
tenders (one that ended in March 2017 and one that started in July 2017), PKP S.A. 
is going to invest a total of PLN 543 million (€127.5 million) in the modernisation 
of several sections of the Trzebinia-Zebrzydowice route, which is used to transport 
transit cargoes from Baltic ports to the south of Europe (Pletnev, 2017). Experts antic-
ipate that problems associated with running transit trains through Poland will persist 
throughout the entire period of the modernisation of Polish railways (Pletnev, 2017).
Infrastructure bottlenecks in Poland have resulted in up to 3,500 cars having been detained 
at the Brest-Małaszewicze crossing point (Tonin, 2017). Several major consignors, including 
Hewlett-Packard (HP), have expressed grave concerns about that crossing point. According 
to HP representatives, the company’s trains running from Chongqing to Duisburg may have 
to wait for the crossing for 2–3 days, while trains running from other Chinese cities may be 
delayed by 5–6 days. Most delays occur at the Belarus-Poland border. Such delays impair 
the competitiveness of the route, which is supposed to offer consignors significantly short-
er delivery times compared to sea routes (RZD-Partner, 2017).
It should be noted that Belarus has commenced an investment project to modernise the 
Brest-North Station. This is expected to boost the average daily processing capacity of the 
station, reduce cargo processing times, and accelerate train passage. Work is scheduled 
to be completed in 2018–2019. Total investments will amount to about $8 million 
(The Belarusian Railway, 2017).
Infrastructure improvement work is also underway at Bruzgi station (the Bruzgi-Kuźni-
ca Białostocka crossing point) and Swislocz crossing point. The objective is to boost the 
processing capacity of cargo terminals and enable proper handling of the ever-increasing 
West-East-West freight traffic. Total investments will amount to approximately $10 million 
(The Belarusian Railway, 2017).
We believe that the Belarusian Railway’s proposal to organise the processing of container 
trains at the Bruzgi-Kuźnica Białostocka crossing point (the first container train was pro-
cessed there in July 2017) and the Swislocz-Siemianówka crossing point is not likely to re-
solve the problems related to exhaustion of the technical capabilities required to boost the 
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Brest Hub container-processing capacity, as the total processing capacity of both existing 
and future Polish infrastructure is considerably less than necessary to deal with the con-
tainer traffic planned by the PRC for 2020 (5,000 Europe-bound trains per year).
Break-of-Gauge Sites
Due to the difference between track gauges used by Russia, Belarus, Ka-
zakhstan, and Mongolia (1,520 mm) on the one hand and by European coun-
tries and China (1,435 mm) on the other, the use of international railway 
routes along the China-EAEU-EU axis necessitates cargo transhipment, bo-
gie exchange, or use of automated gauge conversion technology. Accord-
ingly, break-of-gauge sites exist at both the western and the eastern borders 
of the 1,520-mm area.
Break-of-gauge crossing points in the West:
• Belarusian-Polish border:
— Brest (Belarus) — Małaszewicze (Poland);
— Bruzgi (Belarus) — Kuźnica Białostocka (Poland).
• Polish-Russian border:
— So far, transhipment stations in Kaliningrad Region have not been 
used for international freight transit. At the end of October 2017, a pilot 
container train service was launched from Poland to China with cargoes 
transhipped at Chernyakhovsk Station and then carried to the Cherny-
shevskoe-Kybartai (Lithuania) crossing point (TASS, 2017).
Break-of-gauge crossing points in the East:
• Kazakhstani-Chinese border:
— Dostyk (Kazakhstan) — Alashankou (China);
— Altynkol (Kazakhstan) — Khorgos (China).
• Russian-Chinese border:
— Zabaykalsk (Russia) — Manchuria (China).
• Chinese-Mongolian border:
— Erenhot (Erlian) (China) — Zamyn-Uud (Mongolia).
Productivity of break-of-gauge sites is determined primarily by their tech-
nological capabilities.
Technological Barriers Hampering International Railway Freight Traffic
Train length. The length of trains composed by various railway companies (Deutsche Bahn, 
PKP S.A., the Belarusian Railway, Russian Railways, KTZ, China Railways) depends on a 
number of factors: length of station tracks, train weight, locomotive power, route profile, 
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technical capabilities of route legs (crossing points/stations, side tracks, passing tracks and 
waystations, whether automatic block systems are employed, intermediate light signals), 
station track plans and profiles, shunting work conditions at individual stations, technical 
and technological capabilities of intermediate and line stations, marshalling yards, etc.
The length of the train determines the load — in this case, the number of contain-
ers loaded onto container platforms. Most container trains travelling along the PRC-
EAEU-EU axis use 40-foot platforms, which can hold two 20-foot containers (TEU) or 
one 40-foot container (FEU). The use of 60-foot platforms and 80-foot platforms from 
Brest in the direction of Małaszewicze and further on is currently restricted5.
Most container trains from China reaching China-Kazakhstan border crossing points 
consist of 54 conventional railway cars (one conventional railway car = 13.92 m, 
rounded to 14 m). Therefore, the length of the train (counting only the platforms) 
is 756 m. The full length of the train, including the length of the locomotive (about 
33–35 m) and location tolerance (10 m), is 801 m. Taking into consideration the length 
of the tracks at Dostyk station, that train length is quite acceptable for Kazakhstan.
In Russia (Russian Railways), an average train is composed of 71 conventional rail-
way cars (994 m), which, together with the locomotive length and location tolerance, 
produces a total train length of 1,040 m. Depending on a number of factors, the “cars- 
only length” can be shorter, about 800 m. The standard useful length of arrival-depar-
ture tracks is 850 m, 1,050 m, 1,250 m, or 1,550 m.
The length of the train depends on the length of the side tracks at holding 
stations to be passed by the train. As a rule, the train is composed of 40 cars; 
however, a “through-running” train can have more than 60 cars.
The key factor affecting train composition is not the length, but rather the 
weight, as well as the locomotive power and relevant track section profile. At 
single-track sections (which are not uncommon in Europe), the length of the 
train should not exceed the distance between exit signals or side-track limit 
signals. Therefore, the length of the train can vary from 300 m to 1,200 m, 
with 1,000 m occurring most frequently.
Empty trains can be even longer, with up to 100 cars. The length of a train 
with many heavy cars is often less than the standard length, and this is every-
day practice rather than a violation.
The standard length (number of conventional railway cars making up a train) is a 
technical parameter that plays an important role in managing railway operations.
Thus, for train composition purposes, a reduced standard length is an ad-
vantage, as it minimises car storage and processing costs. Increasing the 
standard length of the train increases the time required for transit train pro-
cessing at intermediate stations, as these two values are directly proportion-
al to one another.
5 One of the protocol events that took place on June 20, 2016, during the visit of PRC President Xi Jinping to Poland, was the 
arrival in Warsaw of the first China Railway Express container train. The train was composed of twenty-two 80-foot six-axle 
Sggrs container platforms (locomotive: EU07), with two 40-foot containers on each platform. It was, essentially, a demo 
train (Xinhua, 2016).
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On the other hand, a higher standard train length has a beneficial effect 
on train schedules (by reducing the amount of traffic, albeit at the cost of 
slower train speeds) and operation of locomotives. The more income is gen-
erated by each car, the more economic sense it makes to invest in curtailing 
car turnover periods. 
In Belarus (the Belarusian Railway), the length of the car portion of the train varies from 
section to section, ranging from 57 to 65 conventional railway cars (up to 910 m). Together 
with the length of the locomotive and location tolerance, train lengths reach up to 955 m.
Train lengths used by PKP S.A. (Poland) are considerably shorter. According to appli-
cable norms and regulations, train length may not exceed 600 m. However, there are 
plans to enable the use of trains with lengths of up to 750 m, or even 2,332 m (108 cars 
plus locomotive) (Lewandowski, 2016).
We can assume that trains currently leaving Małaszewicze have a maximum of 43 
cars carrying 86 TEU. As a result, if a 65-car container train arrives at the border with 
Poland, a 43-car train is composed as containers are transhipped in Brest, while the 
remaining 22 cars have to wait at the marshalling station for the next train to be 
made up. Alternatively, the number of containers delivered to the transhipment area 
should be exactly the same as the number of containers that can be loaded onto a 
container train pursuant to PKP S.A. terms and conditions (i.e. 86 TEU).
Railway Track Gauge, Railway Electrification, and Axle Loads. In the former USSR and 
Mongolia, railway track gauge is 1,520 mm; in Finland it is 1,524 mm, and rolling 
stock can enter those countries without any hitch or hindrance. Moreover, acceptable 
car dimensions, braking systems, couplings, etc. are identical.
In Western Europe, railways have one of three track gauges. The most frequently used 
one is 1,435 mm; in Spain and Portugal it is 1,668 mm; in Ireland, 1,600 mm.
The difference in railway track gauges between former USSR countries (1,520 mm), 
the PRC (1,435 mm), and Western Europe (1,435 mm) requires the transhipment of 
cargoes or exchange of bogies at border crossing stations. Naturally, this increases 
transport costs borne by cargo owners, and extends delivery times. There are four 
main technologies used to increase interoperability: (a) delivery by container trains 
with transhipment from rolling stock running on 1,435/1,520 mm gauge to rolling 
stock running on 1,520/1,435 mm gauge; (b) use of variable gauge rolling stock, ena-
bling seamless transition from one gauge to another; (c) bogie exchange at an inter-
change station; and (d) extending the European gauge to the east (Belarus, Russia) 
and to the west (PRC-Kazakhstan), or, conversely, laying broad-gauge tracks in the 
EU or the PRC.
Transhipment of containers from platforms running on 1,435/1,520 mm gauge to platforms 
running on 1,520/1,435 mm gauge requires the completion of various official documents.
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One of the factors hindering high-speed carriage of cargoes by railways is associated 
with electrification differences, in particular the use of direct or alternating current, 
and the resultant differences in overhead contact system voltage. Currently the over-
head contact system voltage in Poland, the usual point of entry for trains travelling 
from the PRC/Kazakhstan/Russia/Belarus, is 3 kV/DC. The same is true for railways in 
the neighbouring Czech Republic and Slovakia. In Germany and Sweden (destinations 
mostly used by ferried passenger trains), the voltage is 3 kV/DC and 15 kV/AC; in Be-
larus, Lithuania, and Ukraine, 3 kV/DC and 25 kV/AC.
Only the 25 kV/AC segment will be developed in Russia. This system assures a much 
higher economic efficiency than the old direct current systems do (3 kV/DC). The re-
sultant tractive force enables the use of heavier trains at lower unit freight costs. On 
the other hand, transition from direct current to alternating current requires replace-
ment of locomotives, re-examination of the whole train, etc. — i.e. it requires more 
time, which automatically increases total costs.
As for axle loads, their increase in Russia is envisaged by the Railway Equipment 
Development Strategy 2030. Russia has already created an ample database on the 
operation of railway cars with axle loads of 23.5 tonne-force and 25 tonne-force 
(tf). Russian Railways is currently testing freight rolling stock that uses bogies with 
27-tf axle loads. In the future, axle loads may be increased to 30 tf, subject to a rela-
tively inexpensive modernisation of existing tracks.
In China, the USA, and Australia, axle loads range from 25 tf to 40 tf (25–30 tf; 35 tf; 40 tf, 
respectively), with infrastructure maintenance costs decreasing exponentially. However, 
each country is unique, and any transplant of international practices onto EAEU soil must 
be selective. In this case, everything hinges on infrastructure. One should remember that, 
in all countries listed above, rail tracks are normally laid on half-rock — this is true even 
for Canada, where most of the railway network is laid in the south, near the border with 
the USA. The situation in Russia is dissimilar — infrastructure that is built, for example, 
on marshy soil behaves under stress in a completely different manner (Gudok, 2017a).
Train weight and length standards stipulated by train schedules are assigned to one 
of the following categories:
— unified standards, which apply to constant weight/length of through trains;
— parallel (increased or decreased) standards, which apply to constant weight/length of 
exit route trains, accelerated trains, container and refrigerator trains, and special trains;
— section standards, which are set subject to locomotive power and station track 
length for the given section.
In addition, differentiated weight standards may be used in routine operations, with 
maximum train weights set for each run depending on the main track plan and pro-
file, the existence of artificial structures, etc.
In exceptional cases, it is possible to deviate from the standard by reducing train 
length by a maximum of one conventional railway car. A single unified standard is set 
for the entire route to enable passage of constant-weight through trains in accord-
ance with route specialisation.
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As regards the delivery of containers by railway transport, a critical competitive ad-
vantage compared to maritime transport can be provided by the development, imple-
mentation, and active operation of the so-called 80-foot container platform capable 
of carrying two 40-foot containers. Moreover, subject to the limits imposed by the 
infrastructure (not only by railway tracks, but also by the overhead contact system6 — 
or lack thereof where diesel locomotives are used), it may be possible to load each 
platform with four 40-foot containers, with two containers stacked up on top of an-
other two, which will result in a massive increase of the load borne by the axle and, 
consequently, by the track, and in a notable reduction of total freight costs.
Freight Train Speeds. Delivery speed is often mentioned as the main argument in favour 
of using land transport to support freight traffic between Europe and Asia. As a rule, pro-
ponents of that argument cite indicators of high speed, superior efficiency of container 
unit trains, etc. However, they seldom (if ever) raise issues related to route lines and their 
actual use, and those related to time limits that are allocated for final operations and 
which, if breached, may necessitate adjustments to those very route lines (schedule dis-
ruptions).
Today the bulk of freight traffic in Russia (more than 80%) uses only 1/5 of the 
entire railway network: specifically, the Eastern Polygon and railway lines leading 
to seaports in the north-west and south of the country. Different sections of those 
railway lines have different speed limits. In most sections, freight trains may trav-
el at 80 km/h. Only 6% of total mainline length has a permitted speed of 90 km/h, 
while the lengths of sections with speed limits of 70 km/h and 60 km/h are 4,000 
km and 5,700 km, respectively. A considerable portion of railway lines has speed 
limits for empty cars. The need to observe speed limits often prevents trains from 
travelling at permitted speeds through adjacent sections, as it takes time for them 
to accelerate and decelerate. There is a paradox here: while the average weighted 
mainline speed is more than 70 km/h, section speeds barely exceed 40 km/h. Inci-
dentally, this speed mode bears a cost penalty due to higher fuel consumption by 
locomotives (Tsypleva, 2017).
For reference: At the end of 1H 2017, freight train speeds in Russia were 
as follows: average section speed — 41.8 km/h; average technical speed — 
47.7 km/h; and route speed — 692.2 km/day (RZD, 2017)7.
6 The overhead contact system consists of wires, structures, and devices used to transmit electrical energy from traction 
substations to current collectors installed on electrically propelled rolling stock. The overhead contact wire is suspended at 
a height not less than 5,750 mm and not more than 6,800 mm.
7 Section speed is the speed at which the train travels between two locomotive change stations, subject to stopovers at 
intermediate stations.
 Technical speed is the speed at which the train travels excluding stopovers at intermediate and section stations.
 Route speed is the average daily speed of a route train subject to stopovers at all stations along the route, with the 
exception of the departure station and the arrival station. Route speed shows how fast route trains travel from the departure 
station to the arrival station.
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Russian experts analysed the impact of speed limits, and identified more than 3,200 
problem spots (total length: 22,800 km) preventing further mainline speed increas-
es. A program targeting reduction of the length of sections with permitted speeds of 
less than 80 km/h by almost 1,100 km was launched in Russia in 2016. Its implemen-
tation will enable a twofold increase in the total length of mainline sections where 
freight trains may travel at 90 km/h (Tsypleva, 2017)8.
The average freight train speed in the PRC is 35.6 km/h, going down to about 
28–30  km/h as trains approach Alashankou at the border with Kazakhstan 
(single-track service, second track not yet in operation) (IIASA, 2018).
The average freight train speed in EU countries is rather modest. In international sec-
tions, it amounts to 18.2 km/h9. According to a report published by the European Court 
of Auditors, over the last several years, freight train traffic in many EU countries has been 
neglected, with shortage of investment capital and lack of modernisation efforts giving 
rise to a noticeable delay in the development of railway infrastructure (ECA, 2016).
Container trains travelling through the EAEU at relatively high speeds slow down 
dramatically as they enter the EU, although European freight rates are much higher 
than those charged in Russia, for example.
Terminal and Logistical Infrastructure
Expansion of the terminal and logistical infrastructure associated with the railway 
network along the China-EAEU-EU axis assures provision of modern logistical servic-
es to consignors and consignees involved in both domestic and international freight 
traffic, including transit traffic. Now that transit cargoes are transported by container 
trains along direct routes without the need for remarshalling (sorting) in EAEU mem-
ber states, priority in creating a backbone network of terminal and logistical centres 
is given to projects designed to meet domestic export/import needs, rather than in-
ternational transit needs (with the exception of 1,520/1,435 break-of-gauge points).
Along with certain other investors, Russian Railways is implementing a large-scale infra-
structural project: the creation of a TLC network in the Russian Federation. The new net-
work (more than 50 TLCs and their satellites, plus renovated railway infrastructure facili-
ties), joined together by regular container trains, will make it possible for Russian Railways 
to support land freight traffic along the EU-EAEU-China axis, one of the tasks formulated 
by the federal special-purpose programme Development of the Russian Transport System.
In 2012, the Russian Railways Management Board approved a document entitled Con-
ceptual Framework for the Creation of TLCs in the Territory of the Russian Federation. The 
document envisages phased construction and commissioning of TLC facilities. At the in-
itial stage, it is necessary to create a backbone network that will serve as an incentive for 
potential investors to join terminal and logistical infrastructure development projects.
8 By the end of 2016, the speed was increased to 90 km/h along more than 1,100 km of total track mileage. By the end of 
July 2017, speed limits were increased along a 95.0 km section for passenger trains, and at a 76.9 km section for freight 
trains; it is expected that upon completion of repair works, passenger and freight trains will be able to travel at higher 
speeds along sections with a total length of 1,357.0 km and 1,167.4 km, respectively (Tsypleva, 2017).
9 This is not “section speed”. In this particular case, this is the speed at which the train moves from the time it leaves the 
departure station to the time it comes to the arrival station.
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Information on first-stage TLC network facilities, as well as on the extent of comple-
tion and a brief description of the relevant projects, is presented in Table 1.
Pursuant to the Conceptual Framework for the Creation of TLCs in the Territory of the 
Russian Federation, new TLC network facilities will be linked to each other by regular 
container trains.
Another major railway administration actively involved in the development of logistics is 
the Kazakhstani company KTZ. The Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan has as-
signed to that company the status of a National Integrated Trans-Logistical Operator.
Several projects designed to put in place logistical infrastructure integrated with Eura-
sian international transport corridors are being implemented as part of the plan for the 
development of the transport and logistical system of the Republic of Kazakhstan. One 
of the largest of these projects envisages the creation, by 2020, of the Khorgos-Eastern 
Gate Free Economic Zone. The Khorgos International Cross-Border Cooperation Cen-
tre, complete with the region’s largest railway port, will serve as its cornerstone. The 
volume of freight traffic that is expected to pass through Khorgos-Eastern Gate FEZ is 
estimated at more than 10 million tonnes (Goreltsev and Polyakova, 2015).
The total territory of Khorgos-Eastern Gate FEZ components (multimodal logistical 
zone, industrial zone, and FEZ infrastructure) is projected to exceed 1,600 hectares 
(3,300 hectares including reserved sites).
There are also plans to build priority TLC facilities in various districts of the follow-
ing Kazakhstani cities: Dostyk, Almaty, Aktau, Astana, Oral, Aktobe, and others. The 
key objectives of those projects are to realise the transit potential of Kazakhstan and 
to develop Eurasian corridors along the Asia-Pacific-China-Kazakhstan-Europe axis 
(Goreltsev and Polyakova, 2015).
1.2. Border and Customs Barriers
Time Required for Completion of Border/Customs Formalities
Border/customs formalities in EAEU member states currently do not represent a serious 
barrier to international transit and trade. EAEU member states pursue a coherent policy 
designed to standardise border/customs rules and documents, and to streamline related 
regulations to minimise the time required to complete border/customs formalities.
The Customs Code of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU CC), which came into ef-
fect on January 1, 2018, envisages:
• automation of all customs systems;
• transition to e-declarations (discontinued use of paper declarations);
• limitation of the list of documents submitted for customs declaration purposes to 
e-declarations (other documents are to be furnished only in special circumstances);
• use of the “single window” system (EEC, 2018).
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This will ensure:
• improvement of customs administration in line with the latest advances in 
information technologies;
• a shift in customs regulation from a national to a supranational level; 
• broad implementation of international best practices in EAEU laws and regulations.
In addition, the new EAEU CC sets a limit on the time that the customs authority may spend 
on completion of customs formalities (four hours), subject to prior notification by the rail-
way carrier, and provided there are no circumstances warranting an additional examination.
Even now, the prescribed duration of border/customs formalities at border crossing points 
in Russia is much less than stated above. Pursuant to the Order of the Federal Customs 
Service of Russia dated August 5, 2015, No. 1572, On Approval of Procedures for the Use 
10 SCCs are subsidiary and controlled companies whose shares and units are owned by Russian Railways. LLC Terminal and 
Logistical Center “Bely Rast” was registered on December 20, 2010 (Russian Railways equity stake: 100%).
No. TLC Name Connecting Station Extent of Completion
1 Bely Rast Bely Rast
SCC10 registered, utility network con-
nection specifications approved, inert 
cargo terminal put into operation. Con-
struction of container terminal underway 
(scheduled completion: 2018)
2 Nizhny Novgorod Doskino First-stage TLC in operation: GEFCO road terminal
3 Yekaterinburg Reshety PJSC TransContainer container yard in operation at Gipsovaya Station 
4 Kazan Vakhitovo Technological concept 
5 Volgograd Maxim Gorky Station Technological concept 
6 Kaliningrad Dzerzhinskaya-Novaya Business plan development completed 
7 Baltiysky (railway port) Shushary
Until recently, CJSC Logistika-Terminal 
acted, for all intents and purposes, as 
a dry port for the First Container Ter-
minal (FCT) and the Ust-Luga Contain-
er Terminal (ULCT). In August 2017, 
control of the terminal passed to PJSC 
TransContainer, which opened the way 
for increased cooperation with other 
terminals at the Saint Petersburg and 
Ust-Luga ports.
8 Tamansky (railway port) 9
th Kilometre Side-track Technological concept 
9 Primorsky (railway port) 
Ugolnaya (alternative 
option: Ussuriysk)
Ugolnaya and Uglovaya Stations for 
container operations. For all practical 
purposes, the stations are operating 
as dry ports.
10 Novosibirsk Kleshchikha Business plan development completed 
Table 1  
Priority Facilities 
Comprising the 
Russian Railways 
TLC Backbone 
Network
Source:  
Institute  
of Economy 
and Transport 
Development
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of Uniform Automated Customs Information System for Completion of Customs Formalities with 
Respect to Railway Vehicles and Goods Transported by Railway Vehicles as Part of International 
Freight Traffic Subject to Submission of Documents and Information in Electronic Form, the 
time allocated for completion of all operations performed by customs authorities to exer-
cise government control at railway border crossing points has been reduced to two hours, 
subject to submission of all requisite information (documents) with respect to the relevant 
goods and vehicles, and provided that no such goods or vehicles have been identified as 
“risk deliveries” that require an additional document check and/or physical inspection.
It is critically important that, once customs formalities have been completed at the exter-
nal border of any EAEU member state, the cargo can then be freely moved across internal 
borders between EAEU member states without the need to perform any additional cus-
toms operations. Therefore, transit container trains travelling along the most intensively 
used transcontinental routes (China-Kazakhstan-Russia-Belarus-Poland) are subjected 
to customs and border inspection only at the Kazakhstan-China border and the Bela-
rus-Poland border (subject to preliminary notification by the railway carrier, and provid-
ed there are no circumstances warranting additional examination).
The “full-cycle” processing of container trains, including break-of-gauge and bor-
der/customs inspection at the Russian border, is performed only at the Zabaykalsk- 
Manchuria crossing point (see above).
When container trains pass through the Naushki-Sukhbaatar (Russia/Mongolia) and 
Vyartsilya-Niirala (Russia/Finland) crossing points, they undergo border/customs 
inspections, but there is no break of gauge. Completion of border/customs proce-
dures at those crossing points takes up to 100 minutes. After modernisation of the 
Niirala-Vyartsilya crossing point, the transport capacity of the station increased to 
550 cars per day (about 105 minutes per container train) (RZD TV, 2015).
The Grodekovo-Suifenhe (Russia/China) international crossing point is currently not 
involved in transcontinental railway container transit between China and Europe, 
but is used for (rather insignificant) bilateral container shipments between Russia 
and China, and by the Primorye-1 International Transport Corridor for delivery of 
Chinese container cargoes through Russian Far Eastern ports (Vladivostok and 
Vostochny). As transcontinental container traffic between China and Europe increases, 
and other crossing points that give access to the Trans-Siberian Railway/Baikal-Amur 
Mainline (Zabaykalsk-Manchuria, Naushki-Sukhbaatar) reach their maximum loads, 
this crossing point may be used more intensively for transcontinental transit from Asia 
to Europe. Container transhipment time in Suifenhe has been reduced to four hours 
(up to six trains per day), and the annual transport capacity of the terminal at Suifenhe 
has increased from 50,000 TEU to 300,000 TEU (Mikhaylov, 2017).
Electronic Document Management
Implementation by EAEU customs authorities of electronic document management 
systems and extensive use by all EAEU railways of uniform consignment notes have 
contributed to unrestricted growth of transit railway freight traffic between China 
and the EU.
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The first step was the introduction of mandatory prior notification of goods imported by rail 
(Russia: 2014) and exchange of electronic documents and data during customs inspections 
of railway vehicles and goods carried by rail. This made it possible to reduce the time re-
quired for customs clearance of goods and vehicles at railway crossing points to two hours. 
The share of foreign trade participants using electronic declarations is close to 100%.
Subject to previous experience of performing customs operations in connection with decla-
ration of goods, the new EAEU CC now includes provisions that replace mandatory submis-
sion of documents at the time of filing of customs declarations with on-demand submission 
based on assessment of the risk of non-compliance with the existing customs legislation.
This enables customs officers to assess the reputation of the consignor in advance us-
ing a proprietary risk management system, and to determine which cars may need to 
be taken aside for selective inspection (so that the switch locomotive can start work-
ing as soon as the train arrives at the station), and which operations can be omitted 
to save time (Solntsev, 2017).
Notably, in 2001 China launched the so-called Golden Customs Project. It is designed 
to accelerate development of electronic document management systems with a view 
to reduce costs and save time. An Internet-based customs clearance system was im-
plemented in 2002 throughout China (Aliev et al., 2017).
1.3 Administrative and Legal Barriers: 
Consignment Note-Processing Systems
Differences between transport law systems are the main administrative and legal ob-
stacle to the increase of freight traffic among the PRC, EAEU member states, and the 
EU. In European countries, freight traffic is regulated by the Convention concerning 
International Carriage by Rail (COTIF). CIS countries, the Baltic states, Albania, Iran, 
the PRC, the DPRK, Vietnam, Mongolia, Hungary, and Slovakia use the Agreement on 
International Goods Transport by Rail (SMGS).
SMGS and COTIF (subject to CIM11) govern the same issues, but resolve them in a 
completely different manner. This is true primarily regarding liability and compen-
sation for partial loss of cargo and failure to meet delivery deadlines. The differences 
became more pronounced following the adoption of a new version of COTIF in 1999 
(the so-called Vilnius Protocol of July 3, 1999). By way of an example, SMGS envisages 
the duty to transport the cargo, and the duty to set the freight rate. The new version 
of COTIF does not permit different contract models.
Therefore, acceptance and dispatch of cargoes throughout the entire route between 
COTIF countries and SMGS countries are impossible in terms of both transport law 
and compliance with customs requirements.  Inasmuch as it appears impossible to 
unify legal norms at this stage, it was resolved, at a series of joint meetings of repre-
sentatives of CIT/OSJD (Central [European] Institute of Transport/Organisation for 
Cooperation of Railways), to create a shipping document that would be recognised by 
all stakeholders, containing all data required by both COTIF and SMGS.
11 CIM — Uniform Rules concerning the Contract for International Carriage of Goods by Rail (Annex B to COTIF).
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In addition, more than ten years ago, the International Rail Transport Committee, 
jointly with the Organisation for Cooperation of Railways, developed the CIM/SMGS 
common consignment note12, which was also recognised as a customs document. As 
of September 1, 2006, it has been used in all cross-border railway freight traffic, and is 
available in electronic format, which is particularly important due to the EU prelimi-
nary notification requirement.
The use of the CIM/SMGS common consignment note in freight traffic between Chi-
na and Europe makes it possible to reduce cargo delivery times and simplify border 
crossing procedures, as it is no longer necessary to switch between the two transport 
legal systems.
The key advantages of the CIM/SMGS common consignment note are as follows:
• idle time at border crossing points is reduced;
• freight costs are reduced by the cost of drawing up a new set of documents;
• customs procedures are significantly simplified, as the CIM/SMGS common con-
signment note is recognised as a transit customs and bank document, and also as 
a document that can be used for combined shipping (for dispatching route trains, 
car groups, individual cars, and containers) (Tsvetkov et al., 2015).
The Chinese National Railway Administration announced that, as of May 1, 2017, all 
transcontinental container freight traffic would be using the CIM/SMGS consignment 
note. The appropriate document was forwarded to the OSJD Committee. CIM/SMGS 
consignment notes will be issued for all container trains travelling from China to 
Europe and back through railway crossing points in Alashankou, Manchuria, Erenhot, 
Suifenhe, and Khorgos (Gudok, 2017b).
This decision represents one more step towards establishing a seamless interface be-
tween the EAEU and the Belt and Road Initiative. The use of the CIM/SMGS consign-
ment note will remove barriers and regulatory discrepancies between legal regimes 
governing freight traffic in the PRC, EAEU member states, and EU countries, lending 
an additional competitive edge to railway transport in Eurasian space.
For the time being, though, the CIM/SMGS consignment note has not been imple-
mented by all players using SMGS and CIM consignment notes. The positive expe-
rience with the CIM/SMGS consignment note shows the importance of its further 
spread among all members of the International Rail Transport Committee and the 
Agreement on International Goods Transport by Rail, and the need to switch to elec-
tronic document management systems using an electronic digital signature.
The CIM/SMGS consignment note has made it possible to reduce international cargo 
delivery times by minimising time losses at border crossings. 
12 The CIM/SMGS consignment note confirms execution of freight contracts in accordance with the Uniform Rules concerning 
the Contract for International Carriage of Goods by Rail (CIM) and the Agreement on International Goods Transport by Rail 
(SMGS) with respect to cargoes transported between states using CIM and SMGS.
2 . RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING REMOVAL OF BARRIERS 
TO INTERNATIONAL FREIGHT TRAFFIC
27
2. Recommendations Regarding Removal of 
Barriers  to International Freight Traffic
Our analysis has shown that the main source of growth of container freight traffic 
along the China-EAEU-EU axis is the trade between China and EU countries, and that 
a significant part of that trade can be switched from maritime transport to railway 
transport. In the immediate future, the potential for increasing container traffic be-
tween the EAEU and the EU and between the EAEU and China is objectively limited 
by the relatively small volume of cargoes that could be switched to railway transport.
No mega-projects are needed to expand the transport capacity of land corridors along 
the PRC-EAEU-EU axis and boost their competitiveness vis-à-vis sea routes. What we 
need is not a “second Trans-Siberian Railway”, but selective elimination of transport 
infrastructure bottlenecks, which can be managed with limited financial outlay: con-
struction of additional railways, electrification of new railway sections, upgrade and 
modernisation of locomotives, acquisition of special rolling stock, improvement of 
border-crossing infrastructure, etc.
There are two main factors preventing the growth of container traffic between China 
and EU countries:
1. Imbalance between container traffic from China to the EU and from the EU to China. 
According to our calculations, when container traffic between the PRC and the EU 
reaches 200,000–250,000 FEU in 2020, the share of actual railway deliveries to Chi-
na of EU export cargoes switchable to railway transport will stand at approximately 
25%, while the share of such cargoes transported by railway transport from China to 
Europe will be merely 7%. When China-EU container traffic reaches 500,000 FEU in 
2030, the total potential of relevant European deliveries to China and Chinese deliv-
eries to the EU will have been used by almost 70% and by only 17%, respectively.
2. Insufficient transport capacity of crossing points at the Belarus-Poland border. In 2017, 
the processing capacity of the Brest-Małaszewicze crossing was almost completely 
exhausted. Accordingly, railway companies started to use all other crossing points at 
the Belarus-Poland border and crossing points in Kaliningrad Region.
To boost the processing capacity of crossing points at the Belarus-Poland border, it 
is important to ensure that investments in relevant infrastructure are made not only 
by Belarus, but also by Poland. The critical factor is the rate of implementation of 
investment projects. If it is too slow, the insufficient capacity of crossing points at 
the Belarus-Poland border will significantly diminish the competitive edge of railway 
routes going through the EAEU. However, EAEU member states have no way to speed 
up construction of railway infrastructure in Poland.
Investing in alternative East-West container train routes could become an alter-
native solution to the problem created by Polish railways. In that scenario, in-
vestors could focus on: (1) extended use of the Saint Petersburg transport hub; 
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(2) international transit use of the transport and logistical infrastructure of Ka-
liningrad Region (transhipment stations in Chernyakhovsk and Kaliningrad). To 
assure full-scale use of the route, it may be necessary to invest in boosting the 
processing capacity of transhipment stations and improving the border crossing 
infrastructure (Poland-Kaliningrad Region, Lithuania-Kaliningrad Region). In any 
event, in the medium and longer term, it would be crucial to make sure that any 
such project is supported by Polish railways.
The problem could be partially resolved by using the broad-gauge Polish railway line 
Hrubieszów- Sławków leading to the new Euroterminal Sławków (processing capaci-
ty: 240,000 TEU per year), provided that a broad-gauge connection to that line is built 
from the Belarus-Poland border. It should be noted, however, that implementation of 
that project can start only at the initiative of the Polish side. Besides, the terminal will 
need to be substantially expanded.
The rate of utilisation of the EAEU railway infrastructure (its transport capacity) by 
container traffic along the China-EAEU-EU axis is still quite modest, and does not 
have a restrictive effect on either the volume or the intensity of such traffic. Howev-
er, spare transport capacity is hardly sufficient to support the anticipated traffic in-
crease until 2020 and for the longer term. Nevertheless, if existing plans to modernise 
the most heavily used sections of Russian Railways, KTZ, and the Belarusian Railway 
along the China-EAEU-EU axis come to fruition, the resultant transport capacity will 
be sufficient to support projected international transit container traffic.
Projects envisaging creation of backbone transport hubs/TLCs in Russia, Kazakhstan, 
and Belarus have already become important investment targets. The lack of backbone 
TLCs in the EAEU pushes up mileage and, accordingly, shipping costs incurred by con-
signors, and increases cargo accumulation and distribution times. Priority objectives 
for the creation of transport hubs/TLCs in the EAEU should be as follows: (1) process-
ing, in border-adjacent areas, of container cargoes entering the EAEU (from the PRC 
and from the EU), and their subsequent distribution by railway/road transport; (2) 
accumulation of container cargoes in hubs/TLCs, and their subsequent exportation 
to the PRC and to EU countries by railway/road transport (short-haul operations); (3) 
possible future accumulation of container cargoes in hubs/TLCs for adding to transit 
container trains travelling along the PRC-EAEU-EU axis.
Plans for the development of transport and logistical centres in EAEU member states 
(such as the Conceptual Framework for the Creation of TLCs in the Territory of the Rus-
sian Federation [Russian Railways] and the Master Plan for the Development of the 
Transport and Logistics System in the Republic of Kazakhstan [KTZ]) will also stimulate 
growth of container traffic, primarily in terms of increasing the complexity of the 
“topology” of both mutual (China-EAEU, EU-EAEU) and transit cargo flows.
Expansion of international freight traffic can also be accelerated by using special con-
tainers/cargo boxes (for chemical and mineral cargoes), and refrigerator containers 
(for food products). This niche has still not been fully captured by EAEU businesses. 
Meanwhile, manufacturing these products offers very good prospects, including in-
vestment opportunities.
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To eliminate existing barriers to international freight traffic, it is very important 
for the countries hosting the main container transport routes to share long-term 
(5–10 years) mutual railway traffic growth forecasts: long-term freight traffic di-
rections and volumes, projected average daily numbers of railway cars processed 
through break-of-gauge points, etc. Exchange of information will enable an advance 
assessment of the administrative and technical measures required to expand railway 
and related infrastructure so as to assure problem-free delivery of cargoes within 
approved timeframes.
It is necessary to fully unify administrative and legal standards governing the passage 
of container trains along the PRC-EAEU-EU axis. The progress achieved in minimis-
ing delays caused by the completion of border and customs formalities and the pro-
cessing of shipping documents (subject to the new EAEU CC that came into effect on 
January 1, 2018, and the use of CIM/SMGS consignment notes for all transcontinental 
container shipments approved by the Chinese National Railway Administration on 
May 1, 2017) brings closer the complete elimination, both at the EAEU-China border 
and within the EAEU, of all administrative and legal barriers to realisation of the full 
freight traffic potential. Since 2018, all relevant operations can be performed during 
the break-of-gauge procedure without taking any extra time.
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3. Business Surveys and Interest of EU Companies 
in Using Trans-Eurasian Transport Corridors
This section presents the most interesting facts learned in the course of an Internation-
al Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) 2017 research project, Trans-Eurasian 
Land Transport Corridors (EU-EAEU-PRC): Assessment of Prospects and Barriers. The 
project was initiated by the EDB, and involved polls and interviews with representatives 
of European businesses (transport and logistical companies, exporters) to measure 
their potential interest in using land trans-Eurasian routes from China to the EU, and 
their willingness to invest in the development of these routes (IIASA, 2018).
The results of the polls and interviews bring us to the conclusion that willingness of poten-
tial EU investors to participate in infrastructural projects along the PRC-EU axis depends 
not only on such projects’ profitability and payback periods, but also on economic stability 
and transparency of decision-making in the countries where they are to be implemented.
Figures 1 and 2 show the extent of interest displayed by EU organisations, private 
companies, and investors in participating in transport/infrastructure projects along 
the PRC-EU axis, with a breakdown by three geographic regions (China, EU, and transit 
countries, such as Kazakhstan, Russia, Belarus, etc.) and by two time ranges (mid-term 
[until 2025] and long-term [until 2040]).
European investors are generally interested in BRI infrastructural/transport projects. 
Conversely, transit countries (including Russia, Kazakhstan, and Belarus) are appar-
ently much less enthusiastic about such projects (see Figures 1 and 2). Unsurprisingly, 
they perceive the EU as the most comfortable operating area.
In the opinion of representatives of the companies that took part in the survey, over 
the longer term, general investment risks tend to increase (and willingness to invest 
tends to diminish) in all geographical regions. There is a considerable decline in long-
term interest shown by European investors in participating in BRI projects in the PRC 
and transit countries. EU company representatives explain this by the considerable 
uncertainty with respect to political and economic stability in those countries.
Potential European investors note that to make BRI projects more attractive over the 
mid and long term, it is necessary for Chinese direct investors to become involved in 
such projects. In the opinion of survey participants, direct investments by compa-
nies from the PRC (rather than credits extended by Chinese banks) may increase the 
investment appeal of BRI projects, signalling emergence of a favourable and stable 
investment environment in the target area.
Willingness of European investors to invest in the European part of BRI transport 
corridors is largely determined by the efficient work of government institutions in the 
PRC. For example, investors may view investments in Polish railway infrastructure 
positively if they are sure that Chinese government institutions will remain stable 
and efficient. On the other hand, EU companies are prepared to share commercial and 
political risks associated with the existing Chinese investment projects.
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Our analysis shows that willingness to invest in infrastructural projects in China, the EU, 
or transit countries in connection with the BRI is determined primarily by the following 
factors:
— quality of transport and logistical infrastructure in the recipient country;
— efficiency of government institutions in the recipient country;
— transport and logistical costs.
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Figure 3 presents information on the impact that certain factors have on investment 
prospects. Apparently, European investors believe that risks emerging in transit coun-
tries are higher than those that exist in the EU or in China. In particular, they mention 
such factors as difference in track gauges (see previous section) and instability of 
freight rates in transit countries. Freight rate policy is listed as an important factor 
specifically in reference to the PRC and to EAEU member states, as European companies 
generally perceive that policy as associated with uncertainty. 
Interestingly, European companies have shown a rather low degree of awareness of 
the advantages associated with the use of trans-Eurasian land transport corridors (de-
livery times, number of active transport modalities, door-to-door delivery capability, 
delivery costs) and of the development status of transport corridors, available routes 
(primarily railway routes), and state of repair of transport and logistical infrastructure 
along the China-EAEU-EU axis.
Figure 4 presents the opinions voiced by European companies with respect to the cost 
and duration of cargo deliveries by standard 20-foot containers from China to Western 
Europe using various types of transport (air, maritime, and railway transport). An anal-
ysis of the respondents’ assessments has revealed a considerable gap in the extent of 
awareness between experts specialising in organisation of China-EU freight shipping 
(such as railway terminal operators) and experts in other areas (seaport operators, 
consignors, etc.). Potential stakeholders who do not have relevant work experience 
perceive land transit shipping along the China-EU route as expensive and relatively 
slow (duration: 20–30 days; cost: approximately $10–15,000). Accordingly, they be-
lieve it inexpedient to consider expansion of railway freight traffic as an investment 
target, on the grounds that railway transport is allegedly more costly than maritime 
transport, while delivery times are roughly similar. Clearly, this is far from reality 
(see EDB Centre for Integration Studies, 2018).
This means it is necessary to actively promote the use of trans-Eurasian railway trans-
port along the PRC-EAEU-EU axis. That will help to draw the attention of European 
consignors to land routes from Europe to China, boost freight traffic from the EU to 
the PRC (including new commodity groups), and, accordingly, reduce the number 
Transit countriesEUChina
F
a
ilu
re
 t
o
 m
e
e
t 
re
q
u
ir
e
m
e
n
ts
F
a
ilu
re
 t
o
 a
b
id
e
 b
y
 a
p
p
lic
a
b
le
 n
o
rm
s
F
a
ilu
re
 t
o
 m
e
e
t 
in
te
rn
a
ti
o
n
a
l r
o
a
d
 
q
u
a
lit
y
 s
ta
n
d
a
rd
s
F
a
ilu
re
 t
o
 m
e
e
t 
in
te
rn
a
ti
o
n
a
l t
ra
n
sp
o
rt
 
q
u
a
lit
y
 s
ta
n
d
a
rd
s
L
a
c
k 
o
f 
sa
fe
 a
n
d
 h
ig
h
-q
u
a
lit
y
 
tr
a
n
sp
o
rt
 in
fr
a
st
ru
c
tu
re
L
a
c
k 
o
f 
sa
fe
 a
n
d
 h
ig
h
-q
u
a
lit
y
 
c
u
st
o
m
s 
in
fr
a
st
ru
c
tu
re
L
a
c
k 
o
f 
sa
fe
 a
n
d
 h
ig
h
-q
u
a
lit
y
 
lo
g
is
ti
c
s 
in
fr
a
st
ru
c
tu
re
L
a
c
k 
o
f 
sa
fe
 a
n
d
 h
ig
h
-q
u
a
lit
y
 
tr
a
d
e
 in
fr
a
st
ru
c
tu
re
D
if
fe
re
n
c
e
 in
 t
ra
c
k 
g
a
u
g
e
s
L
o
w
 c
a
p
a
c
it
y
 a
t 
in
te
rn
a
ti
o
n
a
l 
b
o
rd
e
r 
c
ro
ss
in
g
 p
o
in
ts
In
su
ffi
c
ie
n
t 
h
a
rm
o
n
is
a
ti
o
n
 o
f 
p
ro
c
e
d
u
re
s 
a
t 
b
o
rd
e
r 
c
ro
ss
in
g
s
D
u
ra
ti
o
n
 o
f 
c
u
st
o
m
s 
a
n
d
 b
o
rd
e
r 
c
le
a
ra
n
c
e
S
p
e
c
ifi
c
 r
e
g
u
la
ti
o
n
s 
w
it
h
in
 b
ila
te
ra
l o
r 
o
th
e
r 
in
te
rg
o
v
e
rn
m
e
n
ta
l a
g
re
e
m
e
n
ts
S
e
tt
in
g
 o
f 
im
p
o
rt
 q
u
o
ta
s
R
e
st
ri
c
ti
o
n
s 
o
n
 r
o
u
te
 c
h
o
ic
e
In
fo
rm
a
ti
o
n
 t
e
c
h
n
o
lo
g
y
 r
e
g
u
la
ti
o
n
s
D
if
fe
re
n
t 
le
v
e
ls
 o
f 
te
c
h
n
o
lo
g
y
 
d
e
v
e
lo
p
m
e
n
t
G
o
v
e
rn
m
e
n
ta
l p
ro
c
e
d
u
re
s
E
x
is
ti
n
g
 m
e
c
h
a
n
is
m
s 
o
f 
a
d
m
in
is
tr
a
ti
v
e
 s
u
p
p
o
rt
T
ra
n
sp
o
rt
 f
re
ig
h
t 
ra
te
s
F
re
ig
h
t 
ra
te
 p
o
lic
y
C
h
a
n
g
e
s 
in
 s
h
ip
m
e
n
t 
p
ro
c
e
d
u
re
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7 Figure 3  
Assessment of 
Logistical and 
Transport Factors in 
China, the EU, and 
Transit Countries 
(1 — the factor 
is insignificant, 
7 — the factor 
is extremely 
significant)
Source: 
IIASA (2018)
34
BELT AND ROAD TRANSPORT CORRIDORS: BARRIERS AND INVESTMENTS
 
of empty return containers. As a result, the efficiency of trans-Eurasian transit should 
increase, and costs should go down.
During the polls and interviews, representatives of European companies listed the 
following factors that could considerably increase the investment appeal of transport 
and logistical projects along the China-EAEU-EU axis:
• joint investments by countries along the China-EAEU-EU axis in physical infra-
structure projects and elimination of non-tariff barriers (common and/or mutual-
ly acceptable technologies, standards, development strategies, etc.);
• more efficient international coordination of land transport corridors and related pro-
jects, including coordination of investment policies pursued by countries involved;
• growth of transit potential through development of new business models and joint 
use of rolling stock owned by various operators. Development and implementa-
tion of joint integration projects (extra-long trains, increased train lengths);
• stability and sustainability of freight rate systems, proposals related to their pos-
sible improvement;
• increasing railway utilisation ratios in the West-East direction;
• boosting the investment appeal of BRI projects by popularizing and marketing 
land freight routes along the China-EAEU-EU axis. Increasing the awareness of 
advantages and prospects of land transcontinental transit.
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No. Route Index Regularity (Frequency) Point of Departure
Time of 
Departure
Transit 
Time, days Route Border Crossing Point Country of Destination Transit Countries  
1 X8001 1 per week Zhengzhou North 13:52
~ 15 days Zhengzhou–Hamburg
Alashankou 
Germany Kazakhstan, Russia, Belarus, Poland, Germany
2 X8003 1 per week Zhengzhou North 8:04
3 X8005 1 per week Zhengzhou North 1:59
4 X8069 1 per week Zhengzhou North 4:00 Khorgos
5 X8202/3 2 per week Yutian 18:40 ~ 15 days Zhengzhou (Wuhan)–Hamburg Erenhot Germany Mongolia, Russia, Belarus, Poland, Germany
6 X8014/3 1 per week Chongqing 10:57
~ 15 days Chongqing–Duisburg
Alashankou/Khorgos
Germany
Kazakhstan, Russia, Belarus, Poland, Germany
7 X8020/19 2 per week Chongqing 12:49 Alashankou
8 X8076/5 every other day Chongqing 10:30 Khorgos
9 X8084/3 daily Chongqing 7:01 Alashankou
10 X8434 3 per week Chongqing 18:58 Erenhot Mongolia, Russia, Belarus, Poland, Germany
11 X8412/1 2 per week Chongqing 17:34 ~ 10 days Chongqing–Cherkessk Manchuria Russia Russia
12 X8016/5 1 per week Chengdu North 23:15
~ 12–15 
days
Chengdu–Łodź/
Nuremberg/Tilburg
Alashankou
Poland/Germany/
Netherlands
Kazakhstan, Russia, Belarus, Poland, Germany, 
Netherlands
13 X8056/5 1 per week Chengdu North 14:40
14 X8086/5 daily Chengdu North 22:40
15 X8090/89 daily Chengdu North 12:26
16 X8078/7 every other day Chengdu North 7:52
Khorgos17 X8062/1 1 per week Chengdu North 11:41
18 X8064/3 1 per week Chengdu North 11:31
19 X8406/5 2 per week Jiashan 11:34 ~ 12–15 days Wuhan–Minsk/Hamburg Manchuria Belarus/Russia/Germany Russia, Belarus, Poland, Germany
20 X8017/8/7 2 per week Jiashan 5:38
~ 15 days Wuhan–Pardubice/Łódź/
Hamburg/Duisburg
Alashankou
Czech Republic/Poland/ 
Germany
Kazakhstan, Russia, Belarus, Poland, Czech 
Republic, Germany21 X8011/2/1 1 per week Jiashan 22:29 Alashankou
22 X8035/6/5 1 per week Jiashan 13:40 Alashankou/Khorgos
23 X8024 1 per week Hefei East 18:10 ~ 18 days Yiwu–Madrid Alashankou Spain Kazakhstan, Russia, Belarus, Poland, Germany, France, Spain
24 X8074/3 1 per week Kiaosi/Yiwu 20:44 ~ 12 days Yiwu–Minsk Manchuria Belarus Russia, Belarus 
25 X8088/7 1 per week Kiaosi/Yiwu 12:23 ~ 18 days Yiwu–Istanbul Khorgos Turkey Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Turkey
26 X8066/5 1 per week Hefei East 17:45 ~ 15 days Hefei–Hamburg Alashankou Germany Kazakhstan, Russia, Belarus, Poland, Germany
27 X8402/1 3 per week Suzhou West 2:00 ~ 12 days Suzhou–Warsaw Manchuria Poland Russia, Belarus, Poland
28 X8410/09 1 per week Suzhou West 2:40 ~ 12 days Suzhou–Warsaw Erenhot Poland Mongolia, Russia, Belarus, Poland
29 X8082/1 1 per week Yuntai 11:36 ~ 18 days Lianyungang–Istanbul Alashankou Turkey Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Turkey
30 X8057 every other day Shenyang East 3:35 ~ 13 days Shenyang–Hamburg Manchuria Germany Russia, Belarus, Poland, Germany
31 X8027 2 per week Changchun North 11:18 ~ 13 days Changchun–Schwarzheide (Dresden) Manchuria Germany  Russia, Belarus, Poland, Germany
Table A1  
Weekly China-
Europe Container 
Trains Schedule 
(since January 2018)
Source:  
China Railways 
Container Transport 
Co. Ltd. (CRCT) 
http://www.crct.
com/index.php?m=c
ontent&c=index&a=li
sts&catid=22
32 X8209/10 1 per week Shenyang East 23:12 ~ 12 days Shenyang–Moscow Erenhot Russia Mongolia, Russia 
33 X8059/60/59 daily Shenyang 9:30 ~ 13 days Shenyang–Hamburg Manchuria Germany Russia, Belarus, Poland, Germany
34 X8428/7 2 per month Changsha 11:30
~ 15 days Changsha–Hamburg
Alashankou
Germany (Kazakhstan/Mongolia), Russia, Belarus, Poland, Germany35 X8422/1 2 per month Guizhou 21:20 Erenhot
36 X8426/5 3 per week Shilong 6:30 ~ 12 days Guangzhou–Moscow Manchuria Russia Russia
37 X8302/1 2 per week Tianjin 17:40 ~ 11 days Tianjin–Moscow Manchuria Russia Russia
38 X8303 1 per week Chifeng 22:38 ~ 10 days Chifeng–Chelyabinsk/Kleshchikha Manchuria Russia Russia
39 X8098/7 1 per week Xiamen (Fujian) 9:55 ~ 16 days Xiamen–Hamburg Alashankou Germany Kazakhstan, Russia, Belarus, Poland, Germany
40 X8208/7 1 per week Xiamen (Fujian) 11:20 ~ 13 days Xiamen–Moscow Erenhot Russia Mongolia, Russia
41 X8072/1 1 per week Xuzhou North 23:35 ~ 5 days Nantong–Mazar–i–Sharif Khorgos Afghanistan Kazakhstan, Afghanistan 
42 X8031 3 per week Harbin South 10:36 ~ 10–15 days
Harbin–Moscow, Warsaw, 
Hamburg Manchuria Russia/Poland/ Germany Russia, Belarus, Poland, Germany
43 X8205 1 per week Jining (Nei Mongol) 21:58 ~ 5 days  Jining–Moscow Erenhot Russia Mongolia, Russia
44 X8492/1 1 per week Jiaozhou (Shandong) 2:16 ~ 5 days Jiaozhou–Hanoi Pingxiang/Dong Dang Vietnam Vietnam
45 X8002 1 per week Alashankou 20:24
~ 18 days Hamburg–Zhengzhou Alashankou Germany Kazakhstan, Russia, Belarus, Poland, Germany
46 X8008 1 per week Alashankou 21:58
47 X8040/39 4 per week Alashankou 20:24
~ 18 days Duisburg–Chongqing 
Alashankou
Germany Kazakhstan, Russia, Belarus, Poland, Germany48 X8050/49 1 per week Alashankou 9:30 Khorgos
49 X8306/5 2 per week Erenhot 15:49 Erenhot
50 X8042 2 per week Alashankou 20:24
~ 18 days Łódź/Nuremberg/
Tilburg–Chengdu 
Alashankou
Poland, Germany, 
Netherlands
Kazakhstan, Russia, Belarus, Poland, Germany, 
Netherlands51 X8092/1 daily Alashankou 5:16 Alashankou
52 X8308/7 1 per week Khorgos 9:30 Khorgos
53 X8054/3 1 per week Alashankou 21:58 ~ 20 days Madrid–Yiwu Alashankou Spain Kazakhstan, Russia, Belarus, Poland, Germany, France, Spain
54 X8044/3 2 per week Alashankou 21:58 ~ 18 days Hamburg–Wuhan Alashankou Germany Kazakhstan, Russia, Belarus, Poland, Germany
55 X8408/7 1 per week Manchuria 22:53 ~ 15 days Brest–Suzhou Manchuria Belarus Russia, Belarus
56 X8058 1 per week Manchuria 23:50 ~ 15 days Brest–Shenyang Manchuria Belarus Russia, Belarus
57 X8030/29 2 per week Manchuria 22:02 ~ 15 days Tomsk–Wuhan Manchuria Russia Russia
58 X8204/1 1 per week Erenhot 15:49 ~ 18 days Hamburg–Zhengzhou Erenhot Germany Mongolia, Russia, Belarus, Poland, Germany
59 X8028 2 per week Manchuria 0:34 ~ 15–18 days
Schwarzheide–
Changchun  
(Tomsk–Harbin)
Manchuria Germany, Russia Russia, Belarus, Poland, Germany
60 X8034/3 2 per week Manchuria 22:02 ~ 16 days Tomsk–Chongqing Manchuria Russia Russia
61 X8206 1 per week Erenhot 17:49 ~ 10 days Vorsino–Jining Erenhot Russia Russia, Mongolia
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